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This thesis investigates preferences for honesty in economic experiments. Preferences for 
honesty have attained a fair amount of attention in the last couple of decades, from 
multiple areas within the social sciences, including economics. This thesis may serve as 
an introduction to the field. First, it provides an introduction to experiments in 
economics, before it dives into how economists conduct research on honesty. The 
literature in the thesis provides background to the three research papers reported in the 
last chapter. Through different experimental tasks for studying honesty, this thesis 
provides new insights to several subfields of the literature. The first paper investigates 
how differences in equality affect preferences for honesty and generosity through a real 
effort dictator game, allowing for dishonest reports in the production stage. Comparing 
behavior across treatments, we find that when participants know they are at a relative 
disadvantage, they are significantly more dishonest and significantly less generous. 
Results speak to the literature on moral balancing, self-justification for dishonest 
behavior and generosity. The second paper combine a survey instrument designed to 
measure individual cultural worldviews and a coin-flip honesty task. The data fail to 
support the conjecture that adherents of certain worldviews are more honest on the 
aggregate level. However, when data is disaggregated by gender, the worldviews help in 
explaining the observed gender effect in the data. Results suggest that cultural 
worldviews may help provide a more nuanced understanding of the gender differences 
generally observed in the honesty literature. The final paper of this thesis investigates 
whether the choice of payment scheme affect the level of honesty in a real-effort honesty 
task. Through both a laboratory experiment and a meta-study, the paper finds no evidence 
of difference between the schemes. This result is in contrast to a study reporting such an 
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Many situations in life involve asymmetric information, which in turn allows for 
misreporting of such information, in return for economic benefits. Classical economic 
theory (e.g. Becker, 1968), suggests that whenever an economic agent faces a decision 
where she can misrepresent private information for private gain, she will conduct a cost 
benefit analysis weighing the benefit of misreporting against the risk, and possible 
sanctions, from being detected. If the utility maximization problem consists of these two 
parameters only, we should expect people to be dishonest in all situations where there is 
no chance of detection. Indeed, immoral and dishonest behavior is prevalent in all walks 
of life. Reports of misconduct for private gains are often cited in the media. From 
corporate scandals like Enron and the Volkswagens diesel case, politicians subjecting 
themselves to corruption, teenagers downloading copyrighted materials and dishonest 
employees taking advantage of their employers for personal gain. The Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners estimated that the occupational fraud cost of U.S. 
organizations alone, accounted for 7% of their annual revenues (ACFE, 2008). Naturally, 
the loss of efficiency due to dishonesty has drawn the attention of researchers within 
several distinct fields. In this research, experiments within economics, and social 
psychology, have proven especially prolific. With strict rules of incentives, and no 
tolerance for deception, experimental economics is well suited for investigating 
preferences for honesty. Interestingly, this emerging field of research has found that 
individuals are not as dishonest as one would expect from the classic model, and a recent 
meta-study even imply that participants in experiments leaves most of the available funds 
on the table (Abeler et al., 2019). An important part of the emerging literature on honesty 
has been focused on understanding why we are not observing dishonesty to the degree 
that traditional economic theory predicts. Through controlled laboratory experiments, and 
online survey and a meta-study, this thesis contributes to the literature. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: part 2 of the thesis, provides an 
overview of how economists make use of experiments, and to some of its early findings, 
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relevant to this thesis. Part 3 gives an introduction to experiments in honesty, how such 
experiments are conducted, and gives an introduction to theories of why we are honest 
and provides background for the papers included. Part 4 presents the research papers 
included in the dissertation. 
	 9	
2. The experimental method 
Since the economy encompasses vast amounts of agents, information, and potential 
confounds, economics was for a long time considered a non-experimental science. Due to 
the vastness of potential confounds, econometricians have for long grappled with 
identifying proper counterfactuals (List et al., 2011). The identification problem arises 
since no individual can be observed in two states at once. One can only observe an 
agent’s action, either under one set of conditions or treatment, or, in absence of said 
conditions. However, starting in the latter part of last century, experiments where 
increasingly used to study, and understand, the behavior of economic agents. Since 
laboratory experiments allow for strict control over relevant confounding factors, hence, 
rendering the researcher control over the data generating process, economists can use 
experiments to pinpoint causal inference. When the researcher is in control of the data 
generating process, one can make sure that only one group of subjects receive the 
treatment, and as long as subjects are properly randomized between those receiving the 
treatment, and a control group is not receiving the treatment, the identification problem is 
a lot less severe (List et al., 2011). 
At a very basic level, economic experiments consist of three things: an 
environment, an institution and economic agents. Within the experiment, the researcher 
governs the institution, which dictate the rules and choice sets of the experiment, creating 
the environment where agents make their decisions. In addition to the rules, commonly 
provided through thoroughly written instructions, agents are often endowed with 
financial means. The agents, all with their own individual preferences over outcomes, 
then act to the environment, and are paid based on their decisions.  
2.1 Experimental Design  
At the heart of any experiment lies the ability to identify causal effects. According to the 
Oxford dictionary, causality is defined as “the operation or relation of cause and effect”. 
If follows, that for an effect to be causal, it has to be directly tied to the cause. As long as 
researchers maintain control over all relevant factors in an experimental environment, 
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changing only one parameter between treatments, one can make ceteris paribus 
comparisons, ensuring that the effect measured is caused by a change in the given 
parameter. The effect of experiments, are often measured as an average treatment effect. 
It is assumed, that each individual in a treatment has her own treatment effect, and all 
individual treatment effects are assumed to randomly vary around an average. Since one 
cannot observe an individual both receiving, and not receiving a treatment, we are 
interested in the average behavior of those receiving the treatment. It follows, that since 
we are interested in average effect size, one need to make sure, that all participants are 
equally likely to receive a treatment. If participants holding some observable or non-
observable characteristic, is more likely to receive the treatment than not, one cannot be 
sure whether an effect observed in the experiment is due to the treatment, or the 
characteristic. Economic experiments also follow a strict set of rules, two of which will 
be discussed in this thesis, incentives for the participants and deception1.  
Incentives 
Since economists are interested in how economic agents act in the face of incentives, it is 
important that when testing theory in an experiment, participants are deciding over real 
payoffs (Croson, 2005). The preferred reward medium used to incentivize in economic 
experiments is money. According to Friedman et al. (2004), three conditions have to be 
met for a reward medium to offset any innate characteristics of the participants, namely, 
monotonicity, saliency, and dominance. First, since more money is better than less, it 
meets the monotonicity requirement. Second, as long as there is a clear link between the 
decisions made in the experiment and the associated rewards, as defined by the institution 
(or rules of the experiment), money is salient. Third, changes in participants’ utility have 
to primarily be caused by changes in rewards. To summarize, when participants are paid 
based on their decisions in an experiment, we assume that they maximize their utility 
according to their individual preferences. In addition, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) argue 
that variance in decision tasks are reduced when participants have financial incentives. 
																																																								
1 A full framework of how to run experiments in economics is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For readers interested in the rules and guidelines of experiments in economics, 
please see Croson (2005) and List et al. (2011) 
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Providing incentives is (almost) always required in economic experiments (Croson, 
2005). 
Deception 
Deception is strictly prohibited in economic experiments. This includes all forms of 
deception, like information about other participants, payoffs associated with decisions 
and the purpose of the experiment. Croson (2005) argues that breaking any of these forms 
of deception can result in inferior test of the underlying theory. If participants don’t trust 
the experimenter, their behavior may be affected, providing uncertainty about their 
decisions. The worst-case scenario from deceiving participants is that they may no longer 
trust experimental instructions in the future. 
To summarize, researchers are interested in the average treatment effect in the 
experiments. By randomizing subjects between treatments, one can infer causal 
relationships. Amongst several rules in economic experiments, two are particularly 
central when researching honesty in experiments. Participants in honesty experiments 
make decisions over real income, and since they can rely on all information given, they 
should not expect sanctions if they misreport or act dishonestly, unless it is clearly stated 
in the instructions that they can be audited.  
2.2 Early discoveries 
For a long time, economists made use of some extremely useful and simplifying 
assumption about individuals’ behavior. One of the main assumptions behind utility 
maximization was that individuals are purely self-interested. In an early attempt to 
understand whether these assumptions were true, Güth et al. (1982) developed the 
Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, subjects are matched in pairs of two. One of the 
subjects, the Sender, is asked to allocate a fixed sum between herself and the other 
subject, the Receiver. After the Receiver is presented with the sum allocated, she has the 
decision of either accepting the allocation, or rejecting it. Should the Receiver choose to 
accept, both players keep the sum allocated by the Sender. If the Receiver rejects the 
offer, both players receive 0. Now, if the Sender is purely self-interested and only 
motivated by monetary payoff, and she believes the same is true for the Receiver, she 
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should offer the Receiver the minimum sum possible. The Receiver, only caring about 
her own monetary payoff, would be happy to receive free money, and accept the offer. 
This is not what Güth et al. (1982) observed. They seldom observed the minimum offer, 
which clearly contradicts the predictions based on the simplified assumptions about 
economic behavior. This led researchers to the next natural question, why are we 
observing this? Are the offers from the Senders motivated purely by fear of rejection? 
This question led to a new game, the Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Kahneman et 
al., 1986). This game is played as a pure allocation game. The main idea is the same; the 
Dictator receives a fixed sum to allocate between herself and the Receiver. It differs from 
the UG in the sense that it is a pure allocation decision by the Sender; the Receiver can no 
longer reject the offer. Since offers can no longer be rejected, a purely self-interested 
monetary payoff-maximizing agent should now offer 0 to the Receiver. Again, this is not 
what is observed in the literature. Indeed, Dictators tend to offer less than in the UG, but 
the offers are clearly higher than what classical economic theory would predict2. It seems 
that the utility maximization problem of both Senders and Dictators, include something 
more than their own monetary payoff. These classic games sparked a whole field of new 
experiments and theories regarding social norms, and social preferences, and by now it is 
well established that such preferences contribute to the utility maximization of 
individuals (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999). With this in mind, we return to the cost benefit analysis of dishonest behavior 
(Becker, 1968). 
																																																								
2 Both the Ultimatum- and Dictator-game have been replicated ad nauseam with similar 
results. For a review, see Oosterbeek et al. (2004) and Engel (2011). 
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3 Honesty in Economic Experiments 
Becker (1968) postulated, that the decision to act dishonestly was a pure 
cost/benefit analysis of the potential gains of acting dishonestly, versus the cost (possible 
sanctions) one was facing if being caught. If the benefits outweigh the cost, we should 
expect individuals to be dishonest. Bear in mind, that any form of deception is clearly 
prohibited in economic experiments. This entails, that, unless it is clearly stated in the 
experimental instructions, the researchers have no means of sanctioning participants. If 
the individual decision to act dishonestly only involves considerations of monetary 
benefit and its potential cost, we should expect that participants in experiments, when 
given the opportunity, should dishonestly inflate their earnings to the maximum extent. 
Through numerous experiments, this is not what is observed in the literature, where 
subjects forego about 70% of the potential gains (Abeler et al., 2019; Gerlach et al., 
2019). This suggests that in addition to any pecuniary motives, individuals have some 
preference for being honest. Similar to how social preferences contributed to the utility 
maximization problem in section 2, the problem, in respect to honesty, now also involve 
some cost of being dishonest. 
In the following two subsections, we will first look into some of the key theories for 
preferences for honesty, before outlining the most widely used experimental paradigms 
for research on honesty. The focus of these theories and paradigms will be those most 
relevant for the research papers included in this thesis. The last subsection of this part, 
will introduce some literature relevant for the papers presented in section 4.   
3.1 Why are we honest? 
As we have previously demonstrated, economic decisions are not solely based on 
pecuniary motives. We know, that individuals hold some preferences over the welfare of 
others, which the literature indicate stems from an inherent aspiration to adhere to social 
norms, such as fairness or reciprocity. Since individual behavior in simple distribution 
games, such as the ultimatum game and dictator game, is affected by social norms, it is 
intuitive to assume that these norms also play a role in decisions involving dishonest 
behavior (Weibull and Villa, 2005). The literature makes an effort to explain why 
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individuals are honest, and several theories have been proposed. The surprisingly (to 
some) honest behavior of individuals, indicate that we have some intrinsic cost associated 
with dishonesty. Misreporting private information to increase ones own payoff, even if 
the chance of detections is zero, comes at a cost. In a simple extension to the classic 
economic theory, where individuals only care about increasing their income, several 
frameworks have included an intrinsic cost of dishonesty in the utility function (Abeler et 
al., 2019). Abeler et al. (2019) outline three broad interpretations of why people are so 
honest: either lying entails a cost; they are concerned about their reputation associated 
with dishonesty; or adhere to some social norm or social comparison which affect their 
decisions. In the following, this thesis will seek to explain some of the theories most 
relevant to the research presented. 
3.1.1 The Models of Moral Balance, and Moral Self-Concept Maintenance 
In the early nineties, the moral balancing model was introduced by Nisan (1991). 
His model suggests that individuals have some conception of their own moral ideal, 
which is based of all past relevant moral actions within a given time frame. This moral 
ideal, serve as a lower bound of how immoral one can act. Further, Nisan postulates that 
individuals strive to maintain this moral ideal over time, which indicates, that if you have 
been good and done morally right actions in a previous time period, you may allow 
yourself to do something self-serving in another time period, as long as you keep moral 
ideal above your lower limit. Similarly, Mazar et al. (2008) postulate a theory of moral 
self-concept maintenance, where moral behavior is a result of individuals’ self-concept 
and moral identity. As long as individuals do not have to update their perceived moral 
identity, they can allow themselves acts of dishonesty. This insight has been pivotal in 
explaining why we are observing a high degree of partial dishonesty in experiments. 
3.1.2 Self-Serving Justifications 
 Shalvi et al. (2015) propose a framework of self-serving justifications, where 
individuals’ preference for honesty is shaped by their ability to justify their actions for 
themselves. In line with both Mazar et al. (2008) and Nisan (1991), Shalvi et al. 
acknowledge that individuals are conflicted between temptations to dishonestly increase 
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their income, while maintaining their own perception as being honest. He further 
proposes that individuals employ different internal self-justification strategies, which 
drive individual decision-making, and may debilitate psychological costs of acting 
dishonest. These self-justification strategies may occur both before and after an action. 
Pre-violation justifications may be used to justify immoral behavior before they occur, 
and post-violation justifications can be used to mitigate discomfort related to dishonest 
behavior. Common for both justifications, is that they allow the individual to act 
dishonest, without changing their moral self-image. As an example, when Shalvi et al. 
(2011) told subjects to roll a die three times, instead of once, and report the first outcome, 
they were more inclined to report a high outcome. It is likely that subjects bend the rules, 
that is, report the higher of the three outcomes rather than the first, employing a self-
justification for dishonest behavior.  
Paper 1 of this thesis contributes to both the literature of moral balancing and self-
justification. We investigate how unequal treatment can provide participants in our 
experiment with a self-justification strategy for being dishonest. Participants first earn 
their income in a real-effort matrix task, allowing for dishonest reports, before they play 
the dictator game with their payment. This design allows us to first investigate how 
unequal treatment affect honesty, before shedding light on whether dishonest individuals 
seek to restore their moral balance by offering some of their earnings to anonymous 
recipients. 
3.2 Experimental Paradigms in Honesty 
In principle, there are three main paradigms of experimental tasks used within the 
honesty literature. We have Sender-Receiver games (e.g. Gneezy, 2005), real effort tasks 
(e.g. Mazar et al., 2008), and experiments with random outcome (e.g. Bucciol and 
Piovesan, 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). At the core, all experiments in 
honesty involve (at least) one player with private information, which can be 
misrepresented to another player, or to the experimenter, in order to increase ones payoff. 
The paradigms differ in the sense that some allow for individual level data, some entail 
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strategic considerations and some allow for partial dishonesty. In the following, I will 
present each of these paradigms, and explain their main differences. 
3.2.1 Sender-Receiver games 
In Sender-Receiver games (e.g Gneezy, 2005) participants are usually matched in 
pairs. One of them, the sender, observes some state of the world, where one is more 
profitable for the sender and the other more profitable for the receiver, and is asked to 
send a message about which state is observed to the receiver. Which of these states the 
sender communicates to the receiver is up to the sender. She has the option to send a false 
message, which is more profitable for herself, or a true message, which is more profitable 
for the Receiver. In essence, the Sender faces a tradeoff between sending a costly true 
message, or a false but more profitable message. After receiving the message, the 
Receiver acts on the message, and both players receive the associated payoff. This game 
is usually played as a zero-sum game, where the gains for one player are the loss of the 
other. Since the Receiver acts on the message from the Sender, and choose which state 
she thinks is the true state, this game entails strategic considerations. 
 In this game, the researcher has knowledge about the true state for every decision, 
and which message is being sent. This gives the researcher individual level data on 
honesty. A potential limitation of this design is that the decision to act dishonest is 
entirely dichotomous; the message can be either truthful or dishonest, it does not allow 
for partial dishonesty. Also, since this game is a zero-sum game, the senders’ decision 
may be more influenced by social preferences, than in games where the decision bears no 
direct cost for another participant. Given the element of strategic interaction, the 
motivation for dishonest behavior may be affected by strategy, and thus introduce 
potential confounds; this thesis will not include any experiments using Sender/Receiver 
games. 
3.2.2 Random Outcome. 
In experiments with random outcomes, the literature use one of two experiments. 
Either a die-under-a-cup (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011), or a coin-flipping task 
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(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013)3. In die-under-a-cup, the participant is given a six-
sided dice, and is asked to roll it in private, usually under a cup with a peeking-hole on 
the bottom to allow for perfect privacy. Usually, each eye on the die represents different 
payoffs, where one of the outcomes pays zero (e.g. 1 = $1, 2 = $2, 3 = $3, 4 = $4, 5 = $4, 
6 = $0). The number reported by the participant bears no cost for other players, only for 
the researcher, and is usually interpreted as a non-zero-sum game. Unless the die-roll is 
embedded in a software, or survey, the researcher has no way of observing the outcome. 
This means that the collected data is at the aggregate level, and any dishonest behavior 
has to be derived from a theoretical prediction, or by comparing outcomes to a group 
where the outcome is observed (not allowing for dishonest reporting). Also, since the 
outcome of a die-roll is non-dichotomous, this design allows for partial dishonesty. A 
participant rolling 2 on the dice may report that the outcome was 4, and thus be dishonest, 
although not to the maximum extent (which would be reporting 5). 
 In the coin-flip task, the two outcomes are associated with different payoffs (e.g. 
heads = $1, tails = $0). As in die-under-a-cup, this game entail no other player, and is 
therefore considered a non-zero-sum game, without any strategic considerations. Also, 
the researcher usually has no means of observing the true outcome, and the data has to be 
analyzed in the same way as for the die-under-a-cup. In the nature of a coin-flip with two 
outcomes, the decision to act dishonestly will be dichotomous, either the participant 
report truthful or not. Since the outcome is dichotomous, half of the participants will 
receive the positive outcome by chance. Assuming that no participants will be dishonest 
in order to decrease their income4, only half of the participants are presented the 
opportunity to dishonestly report their outcome. An alternative approach is to provide 
participants with multiple coin-flips making the outcome continuous (e.g. Abeler et al., 
2014; Balasubramanian et al., 2017; Cohn et al., 2014).   
            Since tasks with randomly generated outcomes, like die-rolls and coin-flips, are 
																																																								
3 Although this study was published in 2013, they are considered the originators of this 
paradigm. Their working-paper was made available in 2008.  
4 Although this behavior has been observed in a study on Franciscan nuns (Utikal and 
Fischbacher, 2013), it is reasonable to assume it is seldom the case. 
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generally carried out in private, the true outcome is impossible to observe by researchers, 
and dishonest behavior has to be determined statistically. One way to avoid this, and thus 
obtain individual level data, is to embed the random process into the experimental 
software or survey, such as letting subjects watch a video of the given random process in 
private, and then report the outcome. If the software or survey store information about 
which video the subject watched, one would have access to individual level data, 
however this may affect the results5. In a recent paper, Lilleholt et al. (2020) tested 
whether there were a difference in honesty between computerized and non-computerized 
random process experiments. Their results reveal that when the random process is 
implemented within the survey framework, and thus theoretically could be observed in 
real time by the researchers, subjects reported more honestly.  
 
3.2.3 Real Effort Tasks  
Real effort tasks refer to any task where participants are paid by exhorting effort 
in solving a given problem6. This can be simple mathematical search matrices (e.g. Mazar 
et al., 2008), or visual inspection tasks (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). In the matrix-task, 
participants are usually presented with a set of matrices consisting of 12 three-digit 
numbers, and given the task to search for two different numbers within each matrix that 
sum to exactly 10.00. Similarly, in visual inspection task, participants are presented with 
a set of boxes each containing 20 dots, with a diagonal line separating them. The task is 
to decide which side of the diagonal contains more dots. Common for both of these tasks, 
is that participants are paid a piece price per correctly solved task (e.g. $1). Participants 
are given a time limit to search all matrices/boxes, and when the time is up, they are paid 
according to their self-reported performance. 
																																																								
5 A design like this could be interpreted as using deception, however, in an experiment 
embedding a random-outcome, Hermann and Mußhoff (2019) argue that participants 
could conclude that the true outcome and the reported outcome were observed. Hence, it 
would not be deception. 
6 Real-effort tasks are commonly used in economic experiments. For a review, see 
Charness et al. (2018). 
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 Real-effort tasks entail no strategic considerations. If the researcher codes all 
materials given to the participant, the researcher will have access to the tasks after the 
fact, and thus have individual level data. If not, data obtained from these tasks can be 
compared to a control group where participants are not given the opportunity to 
dishonestly inflate their performance, and analyzed on an aggregate level. Since 
participants solve more than one problem, real effort tasks allow for partial lying, and as 
such have a continuous measure of honesty. 
 There are two commonly used payment-schemes in real effort tasks. Most 
commonly, subjects self-report the number of tasks solved to a research-assistant in 
private, and is paid in cash according to their report. Alternatively, participants are given 
an envelope containing cash corresponding to the number of matrices. After the time is 
up, and subjects have counted the number of matrices solved, they pay themselves from 
this envelope in private, before leaving the lab. The difference between these payment-
schemes have recently been interpreted as entailing different moral considerations 
(Hermann and Mußhoff, 2019), and has been reported to affect the level of honesty in an 
experiment with random outcome. However, no effort has been taken in the literature to 
differentiate between the two in experiments with real-effort, despite the fact that both 
payment-schemes are commonly used. As far as the author knows, results from 
experiments using either payment-scheme have been interpreted in the same way, as 
preferences for honesty. Herein, Paper 3 of this thesis seeks to shed light on whether the 
choice of payment-scheme has an effect on the level of honesty in the matrix task, 
through an experiment and a meta-study.  
3.3 Culture 
A debated topic of the literature is whether cultural differences play a role in 
preferences for honesty. A common approach for studies on cultural differences is to 
compare behavior across different geographical locations. Results from research on 
cultural differences in cheating tasks have found mixed evidence of cultural effects. 
Pascual-Ezama et al. (2015) utilized a coin-flip experiment on student samples across 16 
countries, where students were rewarded with a chocolate if they reported the favorable 
outcome. While they found that 62% of the subjects reported the favorable outcome, they 
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did not find any differences in dishonesty across countries. However, for each country, 30 
subjects were randomized into the coin-flip task, this means that on average 15 of the 
subjects would get the favorable outcome, and the other 15 would face the decision to 
report honestly or not. This makes it hard to determine whether the failure to find 
differences across countries was due to homogenous behavior in honesty, or insufficient 
statistical power to detect differences. In a similar study, Mann et al. (2016) applied a die-
roll experiment using both student- and general public-sample across five countries. 
Results reveal that while subjects act dishonestly, and students more so than the general 
public, the level of dishonesty was more or less the same between countries. An 
experiment on tax compliance by Andrighetto et al. (2016) in Sweden and Italy also fails 
to find any significant difference between countries. These studies suggest that 
dishonesty levels are similar across countries. In contrast, Hugh-Jones (2016) reports 
large differences in honesty between countries in a coin flip experiment with an online 
survey sample across 15 countries. Gächter and Schulz (2016) also observe differences 
between countries. Some papers in the literature consider culture at an individual level. 
For instance, collectivism has been linked to unethical behavior. In a priming experiment 
where subjects read a scenario, and is asked to mark words as either collectivistic or 
individualistic, followed by a thought-experiment whether or not to bribe in order to 
make a business deal, Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) report a causal relationship between 
collectivism and bribery. The authors explained their result by collectivists perceiving 
themselves as less accountable for their actions, which reduces individual cost of 
unethical behavior. However, this experiment involves a hypothetical decision to act 
immorally, hence it did not monetarily incentivize dishonesty. In an experiment 
comparing individuals with family background from either East or West Germany, Ariely 
et al. (2019) suggests that mere exposure to socialism, in this case, having a family 
background from East Germany, increase dishonest behavior. Herein Paper 2 of this 
thesis consider cultural worldviews as a predictor for dishonest behavior, by combining 
an online survey on cultural worldviews with a random process honesty task. Results 
from Paper 2, also speak to one of the big debates within the literature, whether there are 
gender differences in preferences for honesty. The debate was sparked by an early 
finding, where Dreber and Johannesson (2008) found that males where more likely to act 
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dishonestly in a sender/receiver framework. However later attempts to replicate this 
finding has had various success. In the aforementioned meta-study by Gerlach et al. 
(2019) they find that men are significantly more dishonest than women, although the 
effect size is rather small. Gerlach et al. report that men on average report 6% higher in 
sender-receiver games, 4% higher in coin-flip, die-roll tasks, and 2% higher in matrix 
tasks. 
3.4 Generalizability  
Generalizability of results from laboratory experiments in economics has been a hot 
debate. Steven Levitt and John List (Levitt and List, 2007a, b)7 have been fierce critiques 
of laboratory experiments in the past, advocating the use of field experiments in stead. 
Their main concern about laboratory experiments is the claim that they hold little 
applications for the “real world”, and hence, lacks generalizability. One of their major 
concerns is that the traditional subject pool in laboratory experiments are students, and 
that the incentives are relatively small. In the aforementioned meta-study by Gerlach et 
al. (2019), fails to find any difference between students and non-students, and except for 
sender-receiver games, incentives did not affect the standardized reports. However, they 
point out, that it is conceivable that since a large proportion of studies included were 
conducted on student populations, that any gender effect, and potentially all other effects 
found in their meta-study may be solely due to the disproportionate participant samples. 
They conclude, that any results from experiments on honesty, should be interpreted with 
caution, and its desirable for future research to include more representative participant 
pools. 
																																																								
7 For a response to this critizism, see Camerer (2011) 
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4. Summary of papers in this dissertation 
The dissertation consists of three papers, all within the topic of preferences for honesty.  
 
4.1 Summary of paper 1: Institutional inequality and individual preferences for 
honesty and generosity 
The first paper, investigates how inequality in advantage shapes preferences for honesty 
and generosity. In a two-stage laboratory experiment, subjects first earn money in a real 
effort matrix task, before playing the dictator game with their earnings. To introduce 
inequality in the real effort task, we provide some of the participants with the solution, 
effectively giving them an extreme advantage over those who did not. Knowledge about 
this advantage is varied between treatments, ensuring that some know that they are at a 
relative disadvantage. This design let us examine how advantage, and knowledge about 
an advantage, affected both preferences for honesty and generosity. The paper reports 
three main findings. First, participants knowing they are at a relative disadvantage engage 
in considerable more dishonest behavior. Second, participants who dishonestly inflate 
their earnings, give more in the dictator game, in line with the expectation from moral 
balancing. Third, the participants at a relative disadvantage engage in less giving in the 
dictator game, indicating that their self-justification mitigate their need for moral 
balancing. 
4.2 Summary of paper 2: Honesty and cultural worldviews 
The second paper reports results from an online study, combining a survey on 
cultural worldviews, and a coin-flip task. Whether culture affects levels of honesty is 
debated in the literature. In the literature, country is commonly used as a proxy for 
culture, whereas this paper considers an individual level measure of culture, cultural 
worldviews. In essence, the cultural worldviews framework is developed on the seminal 
work by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), and is used to place individuals within two cross 
cutting cultural worldviews dimensions. Each dimension reflects distinct features 
	 23	
individuals hold over how they believe society should be structured. These features 
influence the decisions these individuals make, and it is suggested from the literature that 
individuals adhering to individualism and hierarchical worldviews may hold stronger 
social norms (Dake, 1991; Kahan, 2008). The conjecture is that individualistic and 
hierarchical individuals will report more honestly compared to communitarian and 
egalitarian individuals. The data fail to confirm this conjecture at the aggregate level. 
However, when analyzing the data by gender, I find that these two worldviews explain 
the gender difference observed in the data.  
4.3 Summary of paper 3: Cash or report – comparing two payment schemes in a 
real-effort honesty task 
 This paper considers whether the choice of payment scheme affects preferences 
for honesty in a real effort matrix task. The paper consists of two parts. First, the paper 
reports results from an experiment with two treatments, each mimicking the standard 
payment schemes used in this experimental task. Either the subjects pay themselves in 
private, or they report their performance to a research assistant. Part two considers a 
meta-study on the same issue, using experiments with matrix tasks reported in Gerlach et 
al. (2019). Each of the experiments included are coded according to the original authors 
choice of payment-scheme. Results from the meta-study are in line with the experimental 
results in the first part, indicating that choice of payment-scheme in the real-effort task 
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a b s t r a c t 
This paper reports on an experiment that investigates how inequality in advantage affects 
individual preferences for honesty and generosity. In a two-stage experiment, subjects first 
earn money according to self-reported production, which can include honest and dishonest 
reports. Subjects then play the dictator game and decide how much, if any, of their earn- 
ings to share with an anonymous recipient. Treatments investigate how equal and unequal 
advantages in production affect the extent of cheating in stage one and the subsequent 
offers in stage two. When advantage randomly benefits only some of the group, the rel- 
atively disadvantaged are significantly more dishonest and exhibit significantly less other- 
regarding behavior. Considering the interplay between cheating and giving, we find that 
greater cheating was followed with greater giving. And comparing this relationship across 
treatments suggests self-justification for dishonest behavior makes subjects feel more en- 
titled to their ill-gotten gains. 













The efficacy of social and economic institutions often depends on social trust ( La Porta et al., 1997 ; Zak and Knack,
2001 ). Those same institutions however can create contexts that influence people’s preferences for honesty ( Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov, 2016 ; Rodriguez-Sickert et al., 2008 ). That preferences for honesty may be institution-specific suggests that
the policy choices that define institutions not only matter for the outcomes they generate but also for the society they
cultivate. 
Research from the behavioral sciences offer important insights about the interplay between institutional fairness and
preferences for honesty. Early experimental evidence from psychology indicate that paying subjects less than what they
were told to expect leads to more cheating ( Greenberg, 1990 ). Similarly, recent work finds more cheating when earnings
are below the expectations set by distributional norms ( Galeotti et al., 2017 ). Beyond expectations, studies also suggest that
inequities in earnings can affect the level of cheating. For instance, John et al. (2014) finds that people cheat more when
they are aware that other people are earning more for the same task. In a prominent economics experiment, Houser et al.
(2012) reports that subjects were more likely to overstate earnings in a self-reported coin-flipping task when they reported∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone NC 28608-2051 USA. 
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being treated unfairly in a previous, unrelated dictator game. The findings indicate that individual preferences for honesty
are shaped by procedural fairness as well as distributional fairness (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005 ; Frey et al., 2004 ; Greiner et al.,
2012 ). It follows that people may self-justify dishonest behavior when their outcomes emerge from an unfair process. If so,
cheating will depend on the perceived fairness of the institutions that govern outcomes. While inequality may matter, how
the inequality materializes also matters. 
Herein we conduct a laboratory experiment to contribute to the evidence on the interplay between institutional fair-
ness and preferences for honesty. Following the literature ( Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012 ; Mazar et al., 2008 ), we use an
individual real-effort task to collect individual-level data on dishonesty. 1 We extend this line of inquiry by introducing un-
earned (i.e., random) institutional inequities. While some subjects completed the task on their own, other subjects benefited
from receiving assistance. The question is whether the unearned advantage enjoyed by some, increases the likelihood and
magnitude of cheating among those that are relatively disadvantaged. Results may speak to how fairness in our social and
economic systems can shape the norms of individual honesty and social trust. 
This study also contributes to the growing literature on self-justification and moral balancing. Researchers have argued
that people seek to hold their moral self-image constant over time, which may entail balancing good behavior with bad
behavior, or vice versa ( Nisan and Horenczyk, 1990 ). We extend the analysis to include an unannounced dictator game as a
second stage to the experimental design. Using earnings from the previous individual task, subjects decided how much, if
any, of their earnings to give to an anonymous recipient. By introducing an ex post giving stage, we can investigate how the
interplay of institutional fairness and cheating affects subsequent giving. In particular, how does cheating affect subsequent
giving, but potentially more interesting, how does cheating justified by institutional inequities affect subsequent giving. Any
divergent cheating behavior may contribute evidence to the literature on moral balancing. 
Results indicate that institutional fairness and inequities shape individual preferences for honesty and giving. In line with
the literature on self-justification, we find that people with an undeserving relative disadvantage cheat at significantly higher
rates and higher levels. And consistent with moral balancing, people that increased earnings by cheating in turn increased
their giving to anonymous recipients. Interestingly, people that appeared to self-justify cheating gave less, which suggests
that self-justification for dishonest behavior makes subjects feel more entitled to their ill-gotten gains and less compelled
to morally balance their misdeeds. 
2. Experimental design 
2.1. Baseline framework 
The experiment employed a modified real effort dict ator game, which allowed for cheating in the effort st age. 2 Follow-
ing the literature ( Mazar et al., 2008 ), subjects could earn money in the production stage by solving a series of simple
mathematical matrix tasks. Each matrix contained 12 three-digit numbers that ranged between 0.00 and 9.99, and to solve,
subjects had to identify the unique combination of two numbers that sum up to exactly 10.00. Subjects were provided a
sheet of 15 matrices and earned one USD for each matrix solved. 
To collect individual level data, we follow a protocol adapted from Friesen and Gangadharan (2012) . Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to stations, at which they found materials for the first stage of the experiment. The materials were coded
by station and included the instructions, the sheet of matrices, and two envelopes—a money envelope with 15 one-dollar
bills (USD) and an empty earnings envelope that will hold their earnings. Instructions were opened and read aloud. After
answering any questions, subjects had five minutes to solve as many matrices as possible. For each solution, subjects were
instructed to circle the two numbers on the matrix that summed to 10.00. Subjects were informed that some matrices did
not have a solution, which allowed top performers ample opportunity to cheat. At the end of the five-minute period, subjects
were provided solutions and instructed to self-report their overall performance at a designated place on the matrix sheet. 3 
Subjects then paid themselves by taking their earnings from the money envelope and placing it in the earnings envelope.
Any unclaimed money was left in the money envelope. The number of bills taken above the number of matrices correctly
solved represents earnings obtained by cheating. Subjects then placed their completed matrices sheet and money envelope
in a large envelope and sealed it. The large envelope was inserted in the slot of a closed box that was brought to each
subject’s station in sequence. It was announced that the box would remain closed until after the session. This concluded the
first stage. 
The second stage began without delay. Subjects were informed of the second stage only after completing the first stage.
Materials, again coded by stations, were provided for the standard dictator game—all playing the role of the dictator. Subjects
anonymously decided how much, if any, of their stage one earnings to give to an anonymous recipient that was recruited1 Note that most studies on cheating have relied on group-level data, so a strength of this study is that the experimental design draws from Friesen and 
Gangadharan (2012) to yield individual-level data for the analysis. 
2 In a real-effort dictator game, subjects perform a task to earn their endowment, which they subsequently allocate. To ensure subjects were earning 
money for themselves, subjects were informed of the allocation decision only after completing the task. 
3 To avoid subjects altering their answers after receiving the solutions, subjects were provided a blue pen with the matrices. They used a blue pen to 
solve the matrices. When the answers were provided, the blue pen was collected and a red pen was provided. They used the red pen for the remaining 
tasks. 













































from the subject pool. Using an offer envelope provided with the instructions, dictators put their offer in the offer envelope
and kept the remaining money in their earnings envelope. Subjects were then called individually to leave the room. They
inserted the offer envelope in the slot of the same closed box. Within 48 h, the contents of the envelopes were recorded
and delivered to recipients in a separate pre-scheduled session. 
The experiment was conducted at Appalachian State University with a total of 192 subjects in one of eleven sessions.
Each of these sessions lasted about 40 min. Dictators earned about 14 USD, which included a 5 USD participation payment.
Recipients in the dictator game were randomly selected from the subject pool, and did not participate in the experiment,
other than receiving the offers ex post. 
2.2. Treatments 
The experiment followed a 2 × 2 design with two treatment variables—advantage (yes or no) and equal (yes or no). In
the advantage treatments, subjects with no advantage solved the matrices without assistance. Subjects with advantage solved
the matrices with the help of marks that indicated the solutions. Put simply, advantaged subjects were essentially provided
solutions, while the disadvantaged subjects were not. 4 This extreme case of advantage provides ample salience for possible
treatment effects. 
In the equal treatments, subjects in the equal condition had the same advantage status as their peers—i.e., other subjects
in the session. The status was common knowledge. Subjects in the unequal condition did not share the same advantage
status as their peers. Subjects knew that half of the session’s participants were randomly determined to have advantage ,
with the other half randomly determined to have no advantage . Thus, subjects in the unequal condition knew whether they
were relatively advantaged or disadvantaged. 
The experimental design yields three treatments and four fairness conditions. The equal no advantage treatment serves
as the baseline—all subjects in the session solved the matrices without assistance. The equal advantage treatment introduces
an evenly shared advantage—all subjects in the session solved the matrices with assistance. The unequal advantage treat-
ment introduces inequality in advantage and creates an uneven playing field that yields two conditions for subjects. For
the unequal advantage condition, subjects have assistance with solving matrices when others do not. For the unequal no ad-
vantage condition, subjects solve the matrices without assistance when others have assistance. Again, the treatments, equal
or advantaged, were common knowledge. The unequal treatment therefore creates unearned inequities that raise fairness
concerns. Comparisons will reveal the potential impact of advantage, equal and unequal, on the tendency to cheat in stage
one and exhibit pro-social behavior in stage two. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
From the 2 × 2 experimental design, we organize the primary research questions by the decisions in the two stages of
the experiment—two for each stage. The first stage, in which we observe possible cheating, allows us to consider how ad-
vantage and relative advantage affects individual preferences for honesty. We note the advantage treatments are defined by
institutional unfairness, which encompasses both the assistance and resulting benefits of the randomly assigned advantage
treatments. The design does not disentangle the individual components of the unfairness, though previous work shows the
influence of unequal effort and opportunity dominate that of unequal budgets (e.g., Cherry and Shogren, 2008 ). 
The first research question is whether absolute advantage affects cheating, which is informed by testing the null that
cheating is equivalent across the equal no advantage and the equal advantage treatments. Gravert (2013) reports that more
demanding tasks lead to more cheating, so we expect less cheating in the equal advantage treatment than in the equal
no advantage treatment. The second research question considers how relative advantage may impact cheating. We test the
null that cheating in the unequal no advantage treatment is equivalent to cheating in equal no advantage treatment. From
the literature on self-justification (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2011 ), we expect cheating to be more prevalent among the relatively
disadvantaged subjects. 
The second stage of the experiment, in which we observe giving, provides opportunities to examine possible linkages
between cheating and giving across institutional contexts. We again note that, given that the second stage depends on de-
cisions in the first stage, giving behavior is conditional and should be interpreted as such. The third research question is
whether correlations of individual cheating and giving behaviors are consistent with moral balancing—offsetting past im-
moral acts with subsequent moral acts (moral cleasing) and offsetting past moral acts with subsequent immoral acts (moral
licensing). We address this research question by conducting a conditional analysis to test the null that there is no relation-
ship between an individual’s level of cheating in stage one and her level of giving in stage two. Moral balancing suggests that
subjects that increase earnings by cheating will offset that behavior with greater giving. Thus, we expect that cheating will
have a positive effect on subsequent giving. A fourth research question is how the relationship between cheating and giving
differs across the treatments that vary institutional fairness. To the extent that self-justification of cheating varies across
institutional fairness, we expect to observe corresponding variation in moral balancing. Specifically, in the equal treatments,4 A keen reviewer pointed out that subjects in the no advantage treatments knew some matrices did not have solutions while subjects in the advantage 
treatments could infer exactly how many matrices did not have solutions. Any possible confounding effect does not affect the analyses that speak to the 
primary research questions. 
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Production and fraudulent behavior by treatment. 
Equal Unequal 































































N 50 48 47 47 192 




























we expect subjects that cheated in the first stage to moral balance (i.e., moral cleansing) their cheating with relatively high
giving in the second stage. However, in the unequal no advantage condition, subjects may not engage in moral balancing
because they self-justify their cheating in the first stage. Thus, we expect relatively low offers from the dishonest subjects
in the unequal no advantage condition. 
3. Results 
3.1. Stage one: cheating 
The top section of Table 1 provides the actual and self-reported performance on the matrix task by treatment. Fig. 1
complements the numbers with a visual comparison of actual and self-reported earnings by treatment. Overall, subjects
correctly solved an average of 6.84 matrices, but they self-reported solving 9.09 matrices. Thus, across all treatments, sub-
jects overreported their performance by 2.25 solutions or 32.9%. The bottom section of Table 1 provides additional measures
of fraudulent behavior. 5 The numbers show that 35.4% of all subjects over-reported to some extent (i.e., 65% were honest).
About 15% of subjects maximized over-reporting. And, on average, subjects only collected 22.49% of the potential fraudulent
takings. This corresponds well to previous reports in the literature (e.g., Rosenbaum et al., 2014 ). To address the two research
questions for stage one, we look at the numbers by treatment. 
The first research question offers an introductory step by considering whether absolute advantage affects cheating. Fo-
cusing on the equal treatments in Table 1 , we compare the advantage and no advantage treatments. As expected, actual per-
formance was significantly higher in the advantage treatment than in the no advantage treatment (9.54 vs. 4.52; p < 0.001). 6 
The advantage treatment, in turn, appears to have significantly reduced the level of over-reporting relative to the no advan-
tage treatment (0.54 vs. 2.0; p = 0.013). Further, the numbers show that, relative to the equal no advantage treatment, the
introduction of equal advantage lowers the rate of cheating (38.0 vs. 16.7; p = 0.019), lowers the rate of maximal cheating
(6.0 vs. 4.2; p = 0.682), and reduces the average share taken (17.5 vs. 9.6; p = 0.031). The collection of findings indicates that
absolute advantage reduces over-reporting, which follows previous reports that less demanding tasks lead to less cheating
( Gravert, 2013 ). However, we note this finding also may reflect that advantaged subjects inherently have more knowledge
about matrices without a solution. 
The second research question presents a key hypothesis for this study: do institutional inequities affect individual pref-
erences for honesty. In our setting, we consider if over-reporting is significantly different when the lack of advantage is a
relative disadvantage—equal no advantage vs. unequal no advantage. From Table 1 , we first note that subjects with a relative
disadvantage (i.e., unequal no advantage) had lower actual performance than those with an absolute disadvantage (i.e., equal
no advantage)—3.51 vs. 4.52 ( p = 0.052). This is consistent with previous work reporting that effort is negatively impacted
by unfairness. 7 Moving to the research question, a review of the two no advantage treatments shows that relative advantage
matters. Table 1 reports that, among subjects with no advantage, those in the unequal treatment over-reported a great deal
more than those in the equal treatment (6.06 vs. 2.0; p < 0.001). Additionally, among subjects with no advantage, subjects
in the unequal treatment exhibited a higher rate of cheating (70.2 vs. 38.0; p = 0.002), a higher rate of maximal cheating5 Note that we report alternative metrics (e.g., binary variables, means, rates, etc.) to mitigate concerns that results are driven by the higher earnings in 
the advantaged treatments. 
6 All tests reported, are two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Results were similar when using Welch’s t -tests. 
7 For instance, Gächter and Thöni (2010) finds a significant reduction in effort, when workers are paid less than their peers for the same task. 
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(42.6 vs. 6.0; p < 0.001), and took more of the available fraudulent earnings (54.5 vs. 17.5; p < 0.001). Conversely, subjects
with advantage behave similarly whether the advantage is shared equally or not. The tests provide compelling evidence that
institutional fairness affects individual preferences for honesty. Tests indicate that unequal advantage can lead to greater
cheating among the relatively disadvantaged. This finding corresponds to previous studies that context matters (e.g., Cherry
and Shogren, 2008 ) and is consistent with the notion that people self-justify dishonest behavior ( Shalvi et al., 2011 ). 
3.2. Stage two: giving 
Table 2 reports the giving behavior observed in stage two of the experiment. We follow the literature and report four
measures of giving by treatment—the overall mean offer, the percentage of dictators that made a positive offer, the percent
of offers that were equal splits, and offer as a percentage of total earnings. Across all treatments, the mean offer was 1.14.
About 40% of subjects made a positive offer, and 5.2% offered an equal split. Subjects, on average, offered 11.2% of their
earnings. In general, offers from our subjects correspond with previous dictator games in the literature. Reviewing the data
by treatment indicates that absolute advantage tends to increase offers and introducing relative advantage leads to higher
offers among the advantaged and lower offers among the disadvantaged. These findings follow previous reports that un-
earned gains are given away more freely ( Cherry et al., 2002 ) and unearned inequality affects giving ( Korenok et al., 2012 ).
We now disaggregate the data to investigate the two research hypotheses for stage two. 
The third research question considers if observed behavior across stage one and two (cheating and giving) is consistent
with moral balancing—i.e., do subjects offset cheating in stage one with giving in stage two? We estimate a simple regression
model of giving, where the offer amount is a function of legitimate and fraudulent earnings conditioned on the treatment.
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Table 2 
Dictator behavior by treatment. 
Equal Unequal 
No Advantage Advantage No Advantage Advantage Pooled 








































N 50 48 47 47 192 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Table 3 
OLS estimates of offer model. 
Equal Equal Unequal Unequal 































Equal Advantage 0.727 
(0.088) 
– – – –
Unequal No Advantage −0.880 
(0.009) 
– -– –– –
Unequal Advantage 1.274 
(0.000) 
– – – –
F 9.78 20.01 3.43 3.19 0.67 
R 2 0.208 0.460 0.132 0.127 0.029 
N 192 50 48 47 47 
Notes: dependent variable is $-amount of offer; estimated treatment effects are relative to the omitted equal-no-advantage treatment; p- 






















Results are reported in Table 3 . From the pooled model, estimates reveal a significant positive relationship between fraud-
ulent earnings and giving ( p < 0.001). This is in contrast to the absence of a relationship between legitimate earnings and
giving ( p = 0.685). We note this general finding is quite consistent across the treatment-specific models. Estimates there-
fore suggest that greater cheating in stage one is associated with more giving in stage two, which is consistent with moral
balancing. In this case, people acted to balance past immoral behavior with a current moral behavior ( Conway and Peetz,
2012 ; Jordan et al., 2011 ). 
To address the fourth research question, we move to the treatment-specific models to consider how institutional fairness
affects moral cleansing behavior. The conjecture is that moral balancing will be less prevalent when people justify immoral
behavior because of institutional unfairness. When unfairness justifies dishonest behavior, there is little need for moral
cleansing. In our setting, subjects randomly assigned a relative disadvantage (unequal no advantage) may perceive their
relative position as unfair, and if so, they may self-justify their cheating and have no need for moral balancing. Thus, relative
to the other treatments, fraudulent earnings in the relatively disadvantaged condition (i.e., unequal no advantage) will have
a smaller effect on second stage giving. 
Results are consistent with the conjecture. In the two equal treatments, the level of cheating (i.e., fraudulent earnings)
in stage one led to significantly more giving in stage two. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect was considerably higher
in the advantage treatment, which is likely due to the relative ease and size of stage one earnings. Moving to the unequal
treatments, estimates show that fraudulent earnings has a smaller effect on subsequent giving. In the unequal no advan-
tage condition (i.e., relatively disadvantaged), the estimated coefficient is substantially lower than the other treatments.
Relative to equal no advantage treatment, the estimated effect is about 65% smaller—0.084 vs. 0.273. We note the insignif-
icance of the estimated coefficient in the unequal advantage model, which is due to the relatively large standard error.
From the treatment-specific models, we find additional evidence for the conjecture that people will not be compelled to
offset pre vious cheating (i.e., moral balancing) if the institutional unfairness justifies the cheating. Institutional unfairness
appears to not only motivate people to self-justify bad behavior but also diminishes their desire to morally cleanse bad
behavior. 






























Studies provide overwhelming evidence that behavior is context-dependent. It follows that behavior is dependent on
the social and economic institutions that shape the processes and outcomes that define contexts. This paper examines the
role of institutional fairness on preferences for honesty, and by examining connections between cheating and subsequent
giving; it considers the interplay between self-justification and moral balancing. Findings correspond to previous reports that
effort and inequality can influence cheating and giving behavior, but the results also offer new insights on how institutional
fairness affects these behaviors. 
Our results offer strong evidence that preferences for both honesty and giving are shaped by institutional fairness. We
note three main findings from our study. First, in accordance with previous reports that people self-justify dishonest behav-
ior when facing an unfair situation, we find that people with a relative disadvantage engage in considerably more cheating,
both in propensity and magnitude. Second, when considering the relationship between cheating and giving, we observe
behavior in line with moral balancing (e.g., Ploner and Regner, 2013 ; Gneezy et al., 2014 ). People that earned more from
cheating subsequently made more generous offers to anonymous recipients. Third, we find that the relationship between
cheating and giving varies according to institutional fairness. When the playing field is uneven, people with a relative dis-
advantage cheat considerably more and give considerably less. Thus, relatively disadvantaged subjects appear to not only
self-justify their decision to cheat, but they also feel more entitled to their ill-gotten gains. 
The findings speak to current debates on inequities in economic opportunity and mobility, which depend on our social
and economic institutions. Results contribute to the growing evidence that institutions not only matter for the rules they
impose but also for the contexts they create. The interaction between inequality and fairness can dictate the legitimacy of
outcomes and therefore shape individual behavior, such as cheating and giving, which has implications for broader social
and economic well-being. 
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Abstract 
This paper reports findings from an on online experiment that provides new evidence 
on gender differences in preferences for honesty. The experimental design combines a 
self-reported coin-flip honesty task with a survey instrument that measures individual 
cultural worldviews across two dimensions, individualist – communitarian and 
hierarchical – egalitarian. This paper reports three main findings. First, there is no 
difference in the reported number of successful coin-flips across either worldview 
dimension at the aggregate level. Second, and in line with previous research, when the 
data is disaggregated by gender, there are differences in honesty. Third, females 
identifying with individualistic and hierarchical worldviews, report significantly 
fewer successful coin-flips than males with the same worldviews. The proportion of 
females with these worldviews account for the observed gender difference. 
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1. Introduction 
A huge literature within economics and social psychology the last decades have 
provided mounting evidence that preferences for honesty vary within the population. 
In a prominent meta study, Abeler et al. (2019) report that while people are dishonest 
in experiments, only a small proportion (one quarter), of the potential gains of 
dishonesty is taken, indicating that people exhibit strong preferences for honesty. An 
important part of the ongoing research in this field is focused on identifying which 
characteristics affect individual preferences for honesty. In an effort to identify such 
factors, an emerging part of the literature considers cultural differences. When 
considering cultural differences, researchers often compare behavior across 
geographical locations, using location as a proxy for culture. Results from studies in 
various honesty tasks between different locations have found inconsistent evidence 
for differences. While some find that honesty levels differ (Cohn et al., 2019; 
Dieckmann et al., 2016; Gächter and Schulz, 2016; Hugh-Jones, 2016), others fail to 
detect any difference (Mann et al., 2016; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015). In contrast to 
comparing honesty across geographical location, some researchers have applied a 
different approach for examining cultural differences. For instance, when Mazar and 
Aggarwal (2011) primed their subjects as either individualists or collectivists, they 
found that collectivistic subjects were more likely to use bribes in a hypothetical 
decision. By using family background from East Germany as a proxy for exposure to 
socialism, Ariely et al. (2019) found family background to be a good predictor for 
dishonest behavior, indicating that people brought up in socialism are less honest. 
Rather than using priming, geographical location or family background as a proxy for 
culture, this paper extend this literature by considering a measure of individual 
cultural worldviews as a predictor for preferences for honesty. Cultural worldviews, 
defined as a socially constructed orientation that dictates how one interpret and 
interact with society, has previously shown to be a strong predictor of individual 
preferences in various social issues such as gun control and climate change (Kahan et 
al., 2011), free-riding in public goods games (Cherry et al., 2017b) and opposition to 
environmental policies (Cherry et al., 2017a).  Following the cultural cognition 
literature, which postulates that adherents of hierarchical and individualistic 
worldviews are less tolerant towards social deviance (Dake, 1991; Kahan, 2008), the 
conjecture is that these individuals will have higher preferences for honesty. To 
inform the conjecture, this paper combines a short form survey of cultural worldviews 
based on Kahan et al. (2011), and a variant of a coin-flip task commonly used in 
honesty experiments (e.g. Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011), which enables an 
investigation of possible interactions between cultural worldviews, gender and 
honesty in a coin-flip task. Results indicate that individual cultural worldviews matter 
for females, but not for males. In line with the literature, I observe gender differences 
in honesty. By including cultural worldviews, this paper provides new evidence 
contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the gender difference in preferences 
for honesty. 
	
2. Study design 
This paper utilize a variation of the commonly used coin-flip task from the honesty 
literature, where subjects are asked to report the outcome of ten coin-flips each paying 
$0.25 per “heads” 12. Since it was impossible to observe the actual outcome of the 
coin-flips, subjects could over-report with impunity. The drawback of this approach is 
that any difference in honesty can only be determined at the aggregate level. By 
comparing the reported number of successful coin-flips between genders and 
worldviews, it is possible to determine differences in honesty. 
Immediately following the coin-flip task, subjects were asked to complete a survey 
designed to measure their individual cultural worldviews. In this study, and following 
the literature (e.g. Kahan et al., 2011), cultural worldview is defined as distinct 
preferences individuals have over how they think society should be structured, which 
in turn influence how they interact with society. This study used a short form survey 
based on Kahan et al. (2011), which characterize subjects’ worldviews along two 
dimensions: Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism. The 
survey consists of 8 statements that subjects can agree or disagrees with on a 7 point 
																																																								
1	In order to help subjects that did not have a coin nearby, I provided a link to a third 
party website (https://justflipacoin.com/).	
2 The experiment originally included two treatments, a private good and a public 
good. However, there were no difference in honesty between the treatments, which 
could be caused by the treatments not being salient enough. Kolmogorov-Smirnof 
tests revealed that the data had the same distribution in both treatments, and the data 
was subsequently pooled. Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
Likert-scale. Four statements relates to each dimension. When interpreting the data, 
subjects are given a score based on their response, which is then added for each 
dimension, before subjects are classified based on a median split within each 
dimension. Scores, and medians are graphically shown in Figure 1. 
Following the seminal work by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), Kahan et al. (2007) 
developed a framework of cultural cognition, where individuals could be placed 
within two cross-cutting cultural worldview dimensions. The first dimension, 
“Hierarchy – Egalitarianism” determine individuals relative orientation toward 
High/Low grid, relating to preferences for social ordering, while the other dimension, 
“Individualist – Communitarian” relates the individuals relative orientation towards 
weak or strong group ways of life (Kahan, 2008). Literature within cultural cognition 
hints that individuals holding hierarchical and individualistic worldviews may hold 
stronger social norms. According to Dake (1991) “Adherents of hierarchy scrutinize 
social behavior for acts of social deviance because they find insubordination to 
authority a threat to their preferred form of social relations” (Dake, 1991, p. 66). 
Kahan (2008) suggests that individualists may be more concerned with social 
deviance, as it might threaten social order and lead to worse outcomes for the public. 
Since being dishonest easily can be considered breaking social norms, the conjecture 
is that hierarchical and individualists will be less inclined to act dishonest in this 
study. 
I originally recruited 702 subjects through Amazons Mechanical Turk. However, 
upon closer inspection, several duplicate IP-addresses were discovered. All but the 
first observation from each unique IP-address was deleted, leaving a total of 632 
observations. Following the recent debate (e.g. Dennis et al., 2019; Kennedy et al., 
2018) on how international respondents on MTurk have been able to answer surveys 
designed for US respondents through Virtual Private Servers (VPS) or proxies, the 
data collected was screened through the R-package "rIP" by Kennedy et al. (2018). 
This process uncovered several problematic responses flagged as 1 (21) and/or from 
without the US (23), these observations were subsequently dropped from the dataset, 
leaving 590 observations in total3. 
																																																								




Gender	 Age	 Education	 Income	
Male	 62%	 18-30	 29%	 Less	than	high	school	 0%	 Less	than	$15,000	 10%	
Female	 38%	 31-48	 52%	 High	school	 16%	 $15,000	to	24,999	 13%	
	 	 49-67	 17%	 Some	college	 22%	 $25,000	to	49,999	 28%	
	 	 68	+	 2%	 2	year	college	 12%	 $50,000	to	74,999	 24%	
	 	 	 	 Bachelor	degree	 40%	 $75,000	to	99,999	 14%	
	 	 	 	 Graduate	degree	 10%	 $100,000	to	124,999	 6%	




The research questions are organized in three parts.  The first research question is 
focused around the two dimensions of cultural worldviews, individualist – 
communitarian and hierarchical – egalitarian. In line with the cultural cognition 
literature, the conjecture is that hierarchical and individualistic individuals report 
more honest results (Dake, 1991; Kahan, 2008). 
The second research question relates to gender effects. The question is informed by 
testing the null hypothesis that there is a difference in the reported number of heads 
between genders. Following the literature, I expect males to report a higher number of 
successful coin-flips than females.  
The third research question examines any possible interplay between gender and 
worldviews, and consists in two parts. Part one examines any difference in the 
reported number of heads between Individualist – Communitarian and Hierarchical – 
Egalitarian worldviews, within genders. Following the conjecture that individualists 
and hierarchicals consider social deviant behavior as a threat to their worldview, the 
conjecture is that individuals identifying with individualistic and hierarchical 
worldviews to report a lower number of successful coin-flips as compared to 
collectivistic and hierarchical males. The second part considers possible gender 
differences within worldviews. I expect males to report a higher number of successful 
flips than females for all worldviews.   
4. Results 
The results are organized around the three research questions. The first research 
question address differences in honesty between worldviews. The data reveal no 
significant difference in the number of heads reported between any worldviews at the 
aggregate level. 
Result 1: There are no differences in reports between any of the four worldview-
dimensions. 
	
Table 2: Average reported number of heads with associated p-values 
	 Number	of	Heads	
	 Male	 Female	 p-value	
Pooled	 6.82	 6.35	 0.0049	
Worldview	 	 	 	
Individualist	 6.85	 6.14	 0.0025	
Communitarian	 6.77	 6.57	 0.4221	
Hierarchical	 6.95	 5.93	 0.0000	
Egalitarian	 6.60	 6.82	 0.3639	
 
In order to address the following research questions, the data is disaggregated by 
gender. The second research question considers whether there are gender differences 
in the reported number of successful coin-flips. Table 2 reports the average number of 
heads for males and females with the associated p-value4 between them. Figures 1 and 
2 accompany this table to give a graphical presentation of the distributions of reported 
heads. From table 2 we can see that males report on average 0.47 more successful 
coin-flips than females (p=0.0049). This result is in line with several results in the 
literature, stating that males tend be less honest than females, for a recent review of 
the literature, please see Gerlach et al. (2019) or Abeler et al. (2019). 
Result 2: There are gender differences.  
																																																								
4	p-values	reported	are	Welch’s	t-tests	with	unequal	variance.	
The first part of the third research question focus on the possible interaction between 
cultural worldviews and gender. The point of departure is examining whether 
different worldviews affect the level of reported successes for each gender. The data 
reveal no difference for males - individual worldviews does not matter. I observe no 
significant differences in either the Individualist – Communitarian-dimension (6.85 
vs. 6.77; p = 0.6932), or the Hierarchical – Egalitarian dimension (6.95 vs. 6.60; p = 
0.1272).  
Result 3.1: Worldviews does not matter for males. 
On the contrary, individual worldviews seems to matter for females. There is a 
marginally significant difference in the Individualist – Communitarian dimension 
(6.14 vs. 6.57; p = 0.0916), and a large and significant difference in the Hierarchical – 
Egalitarian dimension (5.93 vs. 6.83; p = 0.0004). 
Result 3.1: Worldviews matter for females. 
The second part of my third research question relates to gender differences within 
worldviews. Focusing first on the individual-communitarian dimension, I find that 
individualist males report significantly more successes than individualist females 
(6.85 vs. 6.14; p = 0.0025). There is no observed difference between male and female 
communitarians (6.77 vs. 6.57; p = 0.4221).  In the Hierarchical – Egalitarian 
dimension, hierarchical males report 1.02 more successes than hierarchical females, 
which is significantly more (6.95 vs. 5.93; p = 0.0000), and there are no gender 
differences in egalitarian worldviews. 
Result 3.2: Large and significant gender differences within individualistic and 
hierarchical worldviews. 
 
4.2 Bayesian analysis 
To accompany the t-tests, I have estimated a Bayesian regression model with number 
of heads as the dependent variable and gender and worldviews as independent 
variables. Since the data generating process behind 10 fair coin-flips is known, the 
nature of the data collected in this study is ideal for a Bayesian analysis. This prior 
information about the data generating process can be incorporated into the process of 
estimating parameters in a Bayesian model. 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠 = 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟! !" ! ∗ 𝐸𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛! !" ! ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛! !" !  
 
The model is estimated with the prior distribution set to the theoretical predicted 
outcome of 10 coin-flips for an honest individual (Normal distribution, mean = 5, 
with standard deviation 1.5). Model output is summarized in table 2. 
 
Table	2:	Estimates	of	the	Bayesian	regression	model.		










Intercept 5.88 0.21 5.48 6.29 1 2641 2951 
Male 1.00 0.26 0.50 1.51 1 2446 3004 
Egalitarian 0.79 0.37 0.05 1.54 1 1856 2286 
Communitarian 0.11 -0.62 -0.62 0.82 1 1907 2715 
Male Egalitarian -0.91 0.53 -1.95 0.12 1 1830 2365 
Male Communitarian 0.14 0.48 -0.83 1.07 1 1845 2399 
Egalitarian Communitarian 0.11 0.54 -0.93 1.14 1 1558 2126 
Male Egalitarian Communitarian -0.60 0.74 -2.01 0.85 1 1597 2265 
Note:	Parameters	where	the	lower	and	upper	95	credibility	interval	does	not	include	0,	can	be	
interpreted	in	the	frequentist	way	“significant”. 
The Intercept of this model is interpreted as a female with individualistic and 
egalitarian worldview. In order to compare the estimated outcome between genders 
and worldviews in a sensible way, the corresponding estimates from the model is 
added and reported in Table 35. This table is accompanied by Figure 5, which 
provides a visualization of the full posterior distributions, including the 95% 
credibility intervals.  
																																																								
5	The estimations in the table is done using the Hypothesis function in the R-package 
brms, which also provide the correct 95% Credible Intervals.	
 
Table	3:	Added	estimates	from	the	Bayesian	model,	with	credibility	intervals.	
 Female vs. Male 
 Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Individualist Hierarchical -1 -1.51 -0.5 
Individualist Egalitarian -0.09 -0.98 0.83 
Communitarian Hierarchical -1.14 -1.93 -0.34 
Communitarian Egalitarian 0.37 -0.23 0.96 
 
The model estimates that females with individualistic and hierarchical worldviews on 
average report 1 coin-flip less than males with the same worldview, with a 95% 
certainty that this estimate lies between 0.5 and 1.51 coin-flips, which indicate that 
females holding these worldviews are more honest than their comparable males. 
Comparing Communitarian-Hierarchical females to males, the model estimates an 
average of 1.14 less successful coin-flips with a 95% certainty between 1.93 and 0.34, 
which implies that Communitarian-Hierarchical worldviews effects the level of 
honesty between genders. However, when comparing for Individualist Egalitarian and 
Communitarian-Egalitarian, the credible interval contains zero, which provides no 
evidence for differences. 
These results provides strong evidence that individualist-hierarchical and 
communitarian-hierarchical females are more honest that their male counterparts.  
5. Conclusion 
By comparing the reported number of heads between genders, the results are in line 
with the literature, indicating less honesty amongst men. However, when considering 
individual cultural worldviews, I find that for some worldviews, specifically those 
who identify with communitarian and egalitarian worldviews, men and women are 
equally (dis)honest. These results indicate that the gender difference in preferences 
for honesty may be more nuanced than previously thought. The gender differences 
observed in this study are driven by a group of females, which are significantly more 
honest than everyone else. The main result of this paper materializes when 
investigating the interaction between gender and cultural worldview. I identify that 
females scoring high in two specific cultural worldviews, are significantly more 
honest than all other groups in the study, and that they alone explain the difference in 
honesty between genders. As far as the author knows, this is the first paper to 
investigate the possible linkage between gender and cultural worldviews in an honesty 
task. Surprisingly, this is also the first paper to use a Bayesian framework for 
analyzing results from an honesty task. Since the data generating process is known, 
this data is well suited for Bayesian analysis. In short, this paper sheds new light on 
the previously reported findings that males in general are less honest than females, 
and makes a compelling argument that individual cultural worldviews is a good 









Figure 1: Scatterplot with jitter for measurement scales, lines represent median for each dimension. Subjects 
scoring below median in the Communitarian-Individualist dimension are classified as Communitarian. Likewise, 






Figure 2: Egalitarian - Hierarchical. Histogram of reported coin-flips, with density plot. Disaggregated by gender. 
	
	







Figure 4: Histogram with density-plot for number of heads by worldviews. Disaggregated by gender. 
	







	 Pooled	 Female	 Male	 p-value	
Pooled	 6.64	 6.35	 6.82	 0.0049	
	
By	Worldview	
	 	 	 	
Communitarian	–	Egalitarian		 6.87	 6.90	 6.53	 0.2187	
Communitarian	–	Hierarchical		 6.70	 6.00	 7.12	 0.01115	
Individualist	–	Egalitarian		 6.73	 6.68	 6.77	 0.8538	
Individualist	–	Hierarchical	 6.56	 5.90	 6.88	 0.0002444	
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Cash or Report – comparing two payment schemes in a real 
effort honesty task. 
Johan Birkelund 





Abstract:  Through a real effort experiment, this paper compares honesty levels 
between two payment-schemes in the commonly used matrix task. Subjects in the 
experiment could either dishonestly inflate their earnings by paying themselves more 
than entitled to in private, or, report to have solved more matrices than entitled to. In 
addition to the experiment, this paper also reports from a meta-study on 101 
experimental real effort matrix task treatments using one of the two payment schemes. 
In contrast to studies using randomly generated outcomes, this paper provides 
evidence that the choice of payment scheme in the matrix task has no significant 
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1. Introduction 
Honesty, and trust towards others, can be considered a crucial factor in economic 
transactions, and of the social contract in general. In the late sixties, Becker (1968) 
explained how dishonest behavior was a result of a rational cost-benefit analysis. The 
basic concept was that in any situation involving private information where someone 
could increase their income through misrepresentation of information, without any 
risk of sanctions, we should expect them to choose the income maximizing strategy. 
Surprisingly to some, this is not what we observe. Recent meta-studies like Abeler et 
al. (2019) and Gerlach et al. (2019), even show that people leave most of the potential 
gains from misrepresenting private information on the table. The past decades have 
resulted in a plethora of research papers from several fields, including economics and 
social psychology, in an effort to understand individuals’ preferences for honesty. 
These preferences, have been shown to be context dependent, and influenced by 
amongst others, unequal treatment (e.g. Birkelund and Cherry, 2020), unfair treatment 
(Houser et al., 2012), loss framing (e.g. Garbarino et al., 2018; Schindler and 
Pfattheicher, 2017) and normative cues (e.g. Mazar et al., 2008). In addition, the 
literature indicates that preferences for honesty may be dependent on the source of 
potential gains. For instance, Gravert (2013) report that dishonest behavior was more 
prevalent for subjects exerting real effort, rather than when the outcome was 
determined at random. In contrast, when Kajackaite (2018) directly compares honesty 
levels between real-effort and random-draw task, she finds that subjects report less 
honestly when the gains origins from a random-draw. This suggests that researchers 
ought to be careful when comparing results from honesty experiments using randomly 
generated outcomes, to those where subjects exert real effort. 
In a recent die-roll experiment, Hermann and Mußhoff (2019) aim to shed 
light on the moral cost of lying and stealing. In their experiment, they separate these 
moral costs by having subjects in one treatment report the outcome of a fair dice, 
hence lying, while in the other treatment subjects are given an envelope containing 
cash from which they can pay themselves according to the outcome of the dice, hence 
stealing. Their paper report that subjects were more dishonest when the task was 
framed as lying rather than stealing, arguing that subjects may have a lower moral 
cost associated with lying. However, a different mechanism regarding this finding, 
which is also mentioned by the authors, could be that subjects experienced a 
tangibility effect in the honesty task. Merely dishonestly reporting an outcome may 
entail lower moral cost, than pocketing actual cash. This effect has been observed in 
an experiment where subjects paid themselves more, when they could pay themselves 
in tokens rather than cash (Mazar et al., 2008). Regardless of which mechanism leads 
to Hermann and Mußhoff (2019)’s result, it is clear that their treatments have an 
effect on preferences for honesty in an experiment regarding randomly generated 
outcomes.  
Within the other main paradigm of the honesty literature, the matrix task, 
subjects have to exert effort in solving simple mathematical matrices. This task 
usually employ one of two payment schemes, which are remarkably similar to the 
treatments in Hermann and Mußhoff (2019). If there is a meaningful difference in the 
moral cost of lying and stealing, which is measurable in the same way as in Hermann 
and Mußhoff (2019), then, it follows, that experiments using the matrix task may be 
measuring two different things due to its interchangeable use of the two payment 
schemes. This calls for a thorough investigation. Herein, this paper report results from 
a real effort matrix task experiment, with treatments corresponding to the two 
payment schemes, and a meta-analysis of previously published matrix task 
experiments mediated by payment scheme.  
 
2.  Experimental Design 
 
2.1 Honesty task 
This experiment utilizes the matrix task from Mazar et al. (2008), where subjects can 
earn money by solving simple mathematical problems. Subjects are presented with 15 
different matrices consisting of 12 three-digit numbers. Their task is to find two 
unique numbers within each matrix summing to exactly 10.00, and are told they 
would earn 10 NOK (at the time about 1.2 USD) for each correctly solved matrix. To 
allow for individual level data, the current research follow the protocol of Friesen and 
Gangadharan (2012), where all materials, instructions, envelopes and questionnaires 
were coded with a unique number allowing for identifying all decisions after the fact. 
Subjects were assigned a station in the laboratory at random, at which they found 
general instructions and two questionnaires1. After an instructor read the instructions2 
out aloud and answered questions in private, subjects had 15 minutes to complete 
both of the questionnaires. Immediately following the questionnaire part, subjects 
were provided instructions for the honesty task, as well as a large envelope containing 
the matrices, a cash- or report-envelope and their payment envelope. Instructions for 
the matrix-task were read aloud while subjects followed on paper, and questions were 
answered individually. Subjects had three minutes to solve as many matrices as they 
could. After the three minutes, subjects were instructed to count their correct answers 
and fill out the report, or allocate cash to their payment envelope, depending on 
treatment. 
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory for Economic Experiments 
in Tromsø (LEET) in January and February 2019. A total of 120 subjects were 
initially recruited through lectures at UiT the Arctic University of Norway, however, 
only 76 (31 female) subjects showed up for one of four sessions. The experimental 
sessions each lasted a total of 30 minutes. Participants earned on average about 94 
NOK, including a 50 NOK participation payment. 
 
2.2 Treatments 
The experiment had two treatments. Cash and Report. In the Cash treatment, subjects 
were provided with a cash envelope containing ten 10 NOK coins. After solving as 
many matrices as they could in three minutes, they were instructed to allocate their 
earnings, corresponding to the number of correctly solved matrices, between the cash 
envelope and their earnings envelope. In the Report treatment, subjects were provided 
with a report envelope in which they found a payment slip with the wording “I 
correctly solved ___ matrices, paying 10 NOK each”. Subjects were instructed to 
report the number of correctly solved matrices on this slip.  
 
After the three minutes for controlling matrices and filling out the payment slip or 
allocating cash/tokens to their payment envelope, subjects were called individually to 
receive their 50 NOK show up fee as well as any payment corresponding to the 
reported number of matrices.  
																																																								
1 These were a short form cultural worldviews-, and honesty-humility-survey. Results 
from these questionnaires will not be discussed in this paper. 
2 Complete instructions (in Norwegian) available in the appendix. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis 
The research hypothesis is focused between treatments, Cash vs. Report. We test the 
null, that dishonest behavior is equal between the Cash- and Report treatment. We 
will consider three different measures of honesty, the proportion of dishonest subjects, 
the proportion of subjects being maximal dishonest, and the proportion of available 
funds taken. In line with Hermann and Mußhoff (2019), the conjecture is that subjects 
will experience a higher cost of dishonesty in the Report condition, and thus report 
more truthfully in this condition, compared to in Cash. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Experimental results 
Results from the experiment are reported in Table 1, with a graphical representation 
of dishonesty in Figure 1.  The top section of the table shows actual number of 
correctly solved matrices, the number of matrices reported, and the difference 
between these.  
 









Table 1: Actual and reported earnings, by treatment 
 Cash Report 
Production   
Correctly solved 2.92 (2.22) 3.0 (2.13) 
Reported solved 4.21 (3.55) 4.67 (3.71) 
Over-reported 1.29 (3.64) 1.66 (3.49 
Fraud rates   
Take Some 21.05% (41,30) 34.21% (48.10) 
Take All 5.26% (22.60) 2.63% (16.20) 
% Taken 9.23% (24.81) 13.05% (26.92) 
N 38 38 
 
Starting with the top section of table 1, we first consider correctly solved matrices. 
Whether subjects pay themselves from an envelope containing cash, or report their 
outcome has no impact on their actual performance in the task (Cash vs. Report: 2.92 
vs. 3.0; p = 0.654). In addition, there is no difference in how many matrices subjects 
reported to have solved (Cash vs. Report: 4.21 vs. 4.67; p = 0.593). Although subjects 
in the Report treatment over-report slightly higher than in Cash, this difference is not 
significant (Cash vs. Report: 1.29 vs. 1.66; p = 0.653).  
Turning to the bottom section of table 1, we now consider three different 
measures of honesty. About one fifth of the subjects in the Cash treatment are 
dishonest, while in Report one third claimed to have solved more than they actually 
did. This difference was not significant (Cash vs. Report: 21.05 vs. 34.21: p = 0.205). 
Neither the proportion of subjects taking all of the available funds (Cash vs. Report: 
5.26 vs. 2.63; p = 0.562), nor the percentage of available funds taken (Cash vs. 
Report: 9.23 vs. 13.06; p=0.518) was significant different. 
This striking similarity in honesty levels between treatments, are in sharp 
contrast to the recent results reported from an honesty experiment where subjects act 
on the result of a randomly generated outcome. In a die-roll experiment by Hermann 
and Mußhoff (2019) with otherwise similar instructions and treatments (Cash vs. 
Report), subjects in the report treatment claims to have higher success in the task than 
those in the Cash treatment.  
 
3.2 Meta-analysis 
This section of the paper complements the laboratory experiment by conducting a 
meta-analysis, extending on the meta analysis by Gerlach et al. (2019)3. To address 
our main research question, we have surveyed the 32 papers in the matrix-paradigm 
honesty task, containing 101 experimental treatments from the Gerlach et al. (2019) 
data, and added a variable with information about which payment scheme was used4. 
This allows for comparison of (dis)honest behavior between the two.  
Following previous meta analyses on honesty (e.g. Abeler et al., 2019; 
Gerlach et al., 2019), this study also make use of standardized reports (𝑆𝑅) for 
comparing levels of honesty between Cash and Report experiments. The standardized 
reports used in the current research, are the same as those reported in Gerlach et al. 
(2019)5. 
 









 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 ≥ 𝑡 
where m is the mean number of matrices reported as solved for each experimental 
treatment and t is the expected truthful report. For matrix tasks with individual level 
data, the t is known, and for matrix task using aggregate level data, t is the average 
number of solved matrices in the control group. The minimum and maximum number 
of matrices possible to claim as solved are represented by 𝑡!"# and 𝑡!"#. 
																																																								
3 We gratefully acknowledge the permission from the authors to use their data. 
4	14 papers (32 treatments) used the cash-scheme and the remaining used self-
reported outcome. 
5	This paper will only focus on the two payment schemes, cash and report that where 
coded specifically for our purpose. For a complete description of how studies were 
selected, and different control variables, please see Gerlach et al. (2019)		
 
Figure 2: Violin plot of Standardized Report, by payment scheme. 
	
Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation of all matrix-task experiments, and is 
divided by payment scheme. The dots represent studies within each payment scheme, 
with the size according to number of participants. Within each violin, there is a 
boxplot indicating the mean Standardized Report, and interquartile ranges. For a 
forest plot of all included treatments, see figure 3. The forest plot is organized so 
standardized reports are in ascending order, and all treatments using reported outcome 
are presented first. By visually inspecting the violin- and forest-plot, it seems that 
there is a higher standardized report in experiments using Cash. However, the formal 
meta-analysis with Cash as a moderator, which is reported in table 2, shows that the 






Table 2: Meta analytic random effect model, with Cash as moderator. 
     
 Estimate 95% CI z-value p-value 
Intercept 15% (0.016) [12%,19%] 9.65 <0.000 
Cash 3% (0.030) [-3%, 9%] 0.916 0.360 
Observations k = 101    
 n = 6093    
Heterogeneity 𝐼! = 93.27%    
 𝜏! = 0.02    
 𝑅! = 0.00%    
Note: Coefficients are the standardized report, with standard errors in parenthesis. k is the number of treatments, n 
is the combined number of participants, 𝑰𝟐 is the study variance independent of the number of experiments, 𝝉𝟐 is 
the between-study variance.  
	
Table 3 reports the regression coefficients of a linear mixed effect model with random 
effects at study level. Based on the data from Gerlach et al. (2019), and adding a 
variable for cash, the model estimates the coefficients based on 101 experimental 
matrix-task treatments, from 32 unique studies. Considering the research question, 
whether one of the two commonly used payment schemes affect the level of honesty, 
we see that when subjects pay themselves in cash, the standardized report increase by 
3%, however, this predictor is not significant (p-value = 0.408). Thus, we have 
supporting evidence that the way subjects receive their payment does not affect the 
levels of honesty in the matrix task.  
In an effort to make honesty salient, several papers remind subjects to be 
honest, or tell subjects about the level of honesty of other participants (e.g. Gino et al., 
2009; Mazar et al., 2008). The consensus from the literature is that such ethical cues 
work, where ethical reminders reduce dishonesty, and telling subjects about the 
dishonesty of others increase dishonesty (Gerlach et al., 2019). In line with the 
literature, we can see that normative cues reduce the standardized report by 10.67% 





Table 3: Predictors of Standardized Report. 
  
 Standardized Report 
Intercept 25% (13.64) 
Cash Envelope 3% (3.75) 
Laboratory Experiment  
Online/Telephone - 4%(14.54) 
Field experiment - 6% (9.44) 
Non-economics students  
Non-students - 5% (14.03) 
Economics students 5% (6.89) 
Normative cues - 11% (4.62) * 
Experimental deception 3% (3.70) 
Maximal Externality 0% (0.23) 
Maximal gain 0% (0.05) 
Observations k =101 
 n = 6093 
  
Note: Linear mixed-effect model with random effects at study level. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.5. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Recently, it has been suggested that preferences for honesty differ when payment 
scheme differs (Hermann and Mußhoff, 2019). This has been interpreted as subjects 
having different moral costs associated with lying and stealing, and that the cost of 
lying is lower than for stealing, in an experiment with randomly generated outcome. 
Through an experiment and a meta-analysis, this paper has investigated whether this 
difference is observable in an honesty experiment with real-effort. Both the 
experiment and meta-study provide new evidence. The choice of payment-scheme has 
no effect on the level of honesty in the matrix task. The lack of generalizability of the 
effect, from a task with randomly generated outcome, to one with real effort, may be a 
result of different costs of dishonesty between the two. For instance, when Kajackaite 
(2018) directly compare levels of honesty between randomly generated outcomes and 
performance, she finds that subjects are less honest when they can lie about random 
outcomes. The result reported in this paper is in line with the recent meta-analysis by 
Gerlach et al. (2019), which report that most effects found within one experimental 
paradigm, is not transferrable to other paradigms. This may also be the case for 
different payment schemes. Whether these payment schemes entail different moral 
considerations related to lying or stealing remains unclear. A difference between the 
two could be caused by tangibility. Future research should make an effort to 
disentangle the potential confound of tangibility in the cost of lying and stealing. 
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Figure 3 Forest plot of included treatments 
	
Note: Treatments are ordered by standardized report in ascending order, and separated by payment scheme. 
Treatments using report are on stop. 
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Appendix 
Takk for at du deltar i dette eksperimentet. Vennligst les instruksjonene nøye. En god 
forståelse av instruksjonene vil hjelpe deg å gjøre gode beslutninger og kan øke 
fortjenesten din. Det du tjener i dette eksperimentet er kun avhengig av dine 
beslutninger. Det er ikke tillatt å kommunisere med noen andre deltakere. 
Dersom du har noen spørsmål, vennligst rekk opp hånden, og en av 
eksperimentatorene vil hjelpe deg. Selv om det er mange deltakere i dagens 
eksperiment, så jobber alle individuelt. Dette betyr at det du tjener kun er basert på 
dine beslutninger, og hva andre gjør vil ikke ha noen innvirkning på deg eller det du 
tjener. 
Alle beslutninger du tar i dag blir lagret gjennom en anonym deltaker-ID, og 
kun bli brukt i forbindelse med forskning. Det finnes ingen måte å koble din 
identitet til din deltaker ID. Alle dine beslutninger vil forbli anonym. Dine 
beslutninger i dette eksperimentet vil ikke på noen måte kunne få konsekvenser 
for deg senere. 
Ettersom dette er et økonomisk eksperiment, kan du være trygg på at all 
informasjon du mottar fra oss er sannferdig, og at vi på ingen måte kan gi deg 
villedende informasjon. Dersom det kommer frem at vi har løyet eller villedet 
deltakerne, vil studiet ikke kunne publiseres. 
Eksperimentet består av to deler: 
I del en vil du få 15 minutter til å besvare spørreundersøkelsen som ligger på 
stasjonen din.  
Instruksjoner for del to gis når alle har besvart del 1. 
  
Del 2:                                           
I den store konvolutten på stasjonen din, vil du finne to ark med 15 matriser av 








Din oppgave, er å lete etter to tall i hver matrise, som sammen summerer til akkurat 
10.00.  
Når du har funnet to tall som summerer til 10.00, merker du tallene, og krysser av 










Du vil tjene 10 kroner for hver matrise du finner korrekt løsning til. 
Du vil få tre (3) minutter til å fullføre denne oppgaven. Når de tre minuttene er gått, 
må du gjøre følgende: 
1. Tell antallet matriser du fant løsningen på. Dette er din fortjeneste. 
2. I den store konvolutten vil du også finne en liten konvolutt med femten (15) ti-
kroninger. Du skal nå betale deg fra denne konvolutten. La ekstra ti-kroninger 
ligge igjen, før du limer igjen konvolutten. 
3. Putt alle materialene på stasjonen, bortsett fra betalingen din, i den store 
konvolutten og lim den igjen. Den vil forbli lukket til alle deltakere har forlatt 
lokalet. 
4. En av de som jobber på eksperimentet vil gå rundt med en lukket boks til hver 
stasjon, putt den store konvolutten som inneholder alt utenom betalingen din i 
boksen. Denne boksen vil ikke bli åpnet før alle deltakere har forlatt lokalet. 
5. Bli sittende på stasjonen din inntil du blir henvist til en funksjonær, der du må 
signere for å motta deltakerbetalingen din (50kr). Din signatur vil ikke 
kunne knyttes til dine beslutninger i eksperimentet. 
 
 
Del 2:                                                  
I den store konvolutten på stasjonen din, vil du finne to ark med 15 matriser av 







Din oppgave, er å lete etter to tall i hver matrise, som sammen summerer til akkurat 
10.00.  
Når du har funnet to tall som summerer til 10.00, merker du tallene, og krysser av 










Du vil tjene 10 kroner for hver matrise du finner korrekt løsning til. 
Du vil få tre (3) minutter til å fullføre denne oppgaven. Når de tre minuttene er gått, 
må du gjøre følgende: 
1. Tell antallet matriser du fant løsningen på. Dette er din fortjeneste. 
2. I den store konvolutten vil du også finne en liten konvolutt med en 
betalingslapp. Fyll inn hvor mange matriser du fant løsningen til på denne 
lappen. 
3. Putt alle materialene på stasjonen, bortsett fra betalingslappen din, i den 
store konvolutten og lim den igjen. Den vil forbli lukket til alle deltakere har 
forlatt lokalet. 
4. En av de som jobber på eksperimentet vil gå rundt med en lukket boks til hver 
stasjon, putt den store konvolutten som inneholder alt utenom betalingslappen 
din i boksen. Denne boksen vil ikke bli åpnet før alle deltakere har forlatt 
lokalet. 
5. Bli sittende på stasjonen din inntil du blir henvist til en funksjonær. Når det er 
din tur til å motta betaling, gir du betalingslappen til vår funksjonær som vil 
betale deg tilsvarende det du har fylt inn. Etter dette må du signere for å motta 
deltakerbetalingen din (50kr). Din signatur vil ikke kunne knyttes til dine 
beslutninger i eksperimentet. 
	
